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STATEMENT OF COURT OF APPEALS JURISDICTION: 
This is appeal from a final order of the Sixth 
District Court. 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS: 
This is an action for divorce with a subsequent 
Petition to Modify filed by Appellant. 
ISSUES PRESENTED: 
1 . Whether the lower Court had j u r i s d i c t i o n over 
t h e A p p e l l a n t t o m o d i f y t h e S t i p u l a t i o n and P r o p e r t y 
S e t t l e m e n t A g r e e m e n t w i t h o u t A p p e l l a n t ' s c o n s e n t or 
a p p e a r a n c e . 
2 . Whether the lower Court abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n 
in the f o l l o w i n g p a r t i c u l a r s : 
a . by r e j e c t i n g t h e p a r t i e s ' a g r e e m e n t 
c o n c e r n i n g al imony and t h e m a r i t a l r e s i d e n c e . 
b . by a w a r d i n g a J u d g m e n t a g a i n s t t h e 
A p p e l l a n t for a l imony a r r e a r a g e s . 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND RULES: 
1. Constitution of The United States, Amend XIV, 
Sec. 1. 
2. Constitution of the State of Utah, Art. I, 
Sec.7, and Art. VIII, Sec. 9. 
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3. Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in the 
District Courts of the State of Utah. 
4. Rule 5(a) of the Rules of Practice in the 
District Courts of the State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 
This is a divorce action which was combined by the Court 
with Appellant's Petition to Modify the Decree. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: Course of the Proceedings. 
Plaintiff, Jerry Ann Nunley filed an action for divorce 
against her husband, Kenneth R. Nunley in Sixth District 
Court, Sanpete County, Utah, on September 11, 1985. There 
was no request for temporary support or alimony filed. 
Simultaneously with the filing, the parties entered into 
a settlement agreement which provided, inter alia, that the 
marital residence would revert to her ex-husband upon the 
parties' youngest child attaining the age of 18. There was 
no obligation created in the agreement to pay alimony to the 
Plaintiff. 
On the 19th day of February, 1986, Plaintiff appeared 
with her attorney at Sixth District Court for the purpose of 
obtaining a default divorce from Defendant pursuant to the 
3 
Stipulation* At this proceeding the Court rejected the 
Stipulation, (See Transcript, Divorce Proceedings, P. 7, 
L.16-19), and continued the hearing to March 19, 1986 with 
instructions that defendant be given notice. (TR. Divorce 
Proceedings, P.10, L.24-25). 
The attorney for Plaintiff also offered to give notice 
to the Defendant (See transcript, Divorce Proceeding, P.10, 
L.l-5). At the outset it should be noted that this initial 
attempt to obtain the default divorce on the 19th day of 
i 
February, 1986, was the first of four hearings on the issue 
of defendant's obligation to pay alimony and disposition of 
the marital home. For purposes of reference to the four 
separate transcripts involved in this appeal, the record 
shall be enumerted as TR. 1, 2, 3, or 4, as they occurred in 
chronological order. 
On March 19, 1986, the continuance of the initial 
hearing, Plaintiff appeared personally with counsel, while 
defendant did not appear either personally or by counsel. 
The Court acknowledged and recognized it was without 
jurisdiction over Mr. Nunley due to lack of service upon the 
defendant and, additionally, because of the Court's prior 
rejection of the Stipulation. (TR. 2, P. 4, L. 1-8). 
Counsel for Plaintiff informed the Court that the 
parties had discussed the Court's proposed changes, (TR. 2, 
P.4, L. 10-17), but it was subsequently discovered that 
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defendant never was given notice of the March 19, 1986 
hearing. (TR. 3f P.5, L.13-16). 
The Court, recognizing the risk, indicated it would go 
forward in granting the divorce as modified and indicated to 
Plaintiff's counsel to serve defendant with the final 
documents and in order to give defendant an opportunity to be 
heard on the issue of the modifications. (TR. 2, L. 23,24). 
The Court ordered defendant to pay $250.00 per month per 
child for the two of four children in Plaintiff's custody who 
were still minors. (TR. 2, P.7, L. 20,21). With regard to 
alimony, defendant was ordered to pay $400.00 per month after 
the Court entered an ex parte finding of defendant's income, 
but the Court again repeated its order to Plaintiff's counsel 
to serve defendant with the final Decree and Findings, as 
amended, and recognized defendant's right to disagree with 
the ruling. (TR. 2, P.9, L.5-7). 
The Decree of Divorce was subsequently entered in March 
of 1986, and, in paragraph 9 of the Decree, it was ordered 
that defendant be personally served with the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce and would have 
30 days thereafter to petition the Court for modification of 
the pleadings. 
Eventually, on the 10th of December, 1986, defendant 
made his initial appearance in the proceedings by way of 
bringing a Motion to Conform Decree to Stipulation. 
Defendant, being unaware of the fact that the Court had 
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modified the parties1 original agreement, asked the Court to 
honor the Stipulation as agreed to by the parties. 
At the outset counsel for Plaintiff objected to the 
Motion due to a lack of timeliness in filing within the 30 
day limitation as ordered by the Decree. In his objection to 
the Motion to Conformf counsel for Plaintiff recited that 
defendant was mailed a copy of the Decree in August, 1986, 
and used this date as reasons why the Court should not 
entertain the December, 1986 hearing. (Emphasis Added). 
The Court allowed counsel for defendant to argue the 
Motion, but, thereafter denied the same. Nevertheless, the 
Court allowed for a subsequent filing of a Petition for 
Modification as contemplated by the Decree, (TR. 3, P. 9, L. 
18-25), because of the lack of personal service of the final 
divorce documents upon the defendant. 
On the 20th day of May, 1987, the fourth hearing in this 
matter came on for hearing before the Court pursuant to 
defendant's Petition to Modify Decree. After having heard 
the testimony of both parties and argument of counsel, the 
Court affirmed its prior ruling of $400.00 per month alimony 
and its disposition of the marital home, namely that the home 
be sold and the proceeds divided equally after the youngest 
child attained the age of majority. However, because of a 
Stipulation between counsel, the Court also heard the matter 
of defendant's alleged alimony arrears and subsequently 
entered a judgment against defendant for $3,758.00, a sum 
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that was calculated, with some offsets, from March of 1986, 
the date the Decree of Divorce was granted at the second 
divorce hearing. (TR. 4, P. 64, L. 8-19). 
This appeal resulted. 
RELEVANT FACTS (with citations to the record). 
1. At the first default divorce proceeding of February 
19, 1986, hereafter referred to as TR.l, the Plaintiff 
acknowledges the home she and the children were living in was 
originally defendant's father's home. (TR. 1, P.6, L. 25 and 
Pg. 7, L. 1). Furthermore, Plaintiff indicated to the Court 
on three separate occasions that she did not want the home 
and property (TR.l , P.6, L. 22 and 23, P. 7, L. 14, and P. 
8, L. 11-13,) where Plaintiff also rejects alimony. 
2. At the continued divorce proceeding of March 19, 
1986, hereafter TR. 2, the Court and counsel for Plaintiff 
acknowledge there was no service or notice of the hearing 
served upon defendant (TR. 2, P. 4, L. 1-8). Defendant, of 
course, was not present to be heard. (TR. 2, P. 3, L. 16-
20) . 
The Court also admonished counsel for Plaintiff as to 
the risk involved in going forward without service. (TR 2, P. 
4, L. 18-19). The Court apparently attempted to cure the 
matter of lack of service by ordering plaintiff's counsel to 
personally serve defendant with the Court's modifications 
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c o n t a i n e d in the Decree of D i v o r c e , (TR. 2 , P. 4 , L. 19-22 
and P. 9 f L. 9 - 1 0 ) . The Decree now r e q u i r e s de fendant to pay 
$ 4 0 0 . 0 0 per month a l i m o n y and awards each p a r t y an equal 
i n t e r e s t in the Sanpete County r e s i d e n c e . 
3 . At h e a r i n g n u m b e r 3 , ( h e r e i n a f t e r TR. 3 ) , 
d e f e n d a n t ' s Motion to Conform the Decree to the S t i p u l a t i o n , 
t h e f a c t of l a c k of s e r v i c e of the March 1 9 t h , 1986 h e a r i n g 
was a g a i n a c k n o w l e d g e d when t h e C o u r t , upon c o u n s e l ' s 
r e q u e s t , e x a m i n e d t h e f i l e f o r p r o o f o f s e r v i c e upon 
d e f e n d a n t . There was no n o t i c e or proof of s e r v i c e found by 
the Court . (TR. 3 , P. 5, L. 13 -16 ) and (TR. 3 , P. 6, L. 2 and 
3 ) . Furthermore , the f a c t t h a t de fendant was not p e r s o n a l l y 
s erved wi th t h e Decree and F i n d i n g s w i t h i n the 30 day l i m i t 
imposed by the Decree i s a l s o a c k n o w l e d g e d by P l a i n t i f f ' s 
c o u n s e l . (TR. 3 , P. 7, L. 1 5 - 2 1 ) . 
The a s s e r t i o n t h a t o n l y the Decree and not the F i n d i n g s 
or C o n c l u s i o n s w e r e r e c e i v e d by d e f e n d a n t i s f u r t h e r 
b o l s t e r e d by examining p l a i n t i f f ' s O b j e c t i o n to the M o t i o n . 
In paragraph 4 , i t i s s t a t e d defendant was mai l ed a copy of 
the Decree in August of 1986 . P l a i n t i f f f a i l s t o r e f u t e the 
a s s e r t i o n o f d e f e n d a n t ' s c o u n s e l , t h a t no F i n d i n g s or 
C o n c l u s i o n s were ever ma i l ed t o de fendant (TR. 3 , P. 6, L. 4 -
8; P. 8 , L. 1 2 - 1 7 ) . A l s o , p l a i n t i f f ' s c o u n s e l acknowledges 
he had no proof of d e l i v e r y of the F i n d i n g s t o t h e defendant 
(TR. 3 , P. 9 , L. 2 - 4 ) . 
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4. At the fourth and final hearing of this matter, the 
Petition to Modify the Decree, (hereafter TR. 4), that was 
heard May 20, 1987, the Court finally heard the issues 
comtemplated by the Petition to Modify as awarded in the 
Decree. Further, the Court ruled that no change of 
circumstances need be shown, (TR. 4, P. 5, L. 4-5 and L. 7-
13). 
From this hearing evolved several relevant facts: 
1. That two of the parties' four children would be 
living with defendant as of June, 1987. (TR. 4, P. 12, L. 25, 
P. 13, L. 1-2; P. 13, L. 18). 
2. That Defendant acquired the marital residence from 
his father. (TR. 4, P. 16, L. 23-24). That the acquisition 
was through inheritance in 1972. (TR. 4, L. 1-12). That the 
home was fully paid for 16 years before plaintiff and 
defendant lived in it (TR. 4, L.13-18). 
3. That from September, 1985, defendant paid to 
plaintiff $600.00 per month on a voluntary basis and 
continued to do so throughout the proceedings. (TR. 4, P. 20, 
L. 11-25; P. 21, L. 1-10). (It should be noted that the 
Stipulation and Decree only required $500.00 per month as 
child support payments). That defendant considered this 
$600.00 per month payment by him as all child support. (TR. 
4, P. 35, L. 19). 
4. With regard to the residence, even as recently as 
May of 1987, she continued to renounce any claim to the 
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marital home because she had no use for it. (TR. 4, P. 37, L. 
22-25; P. 38, L. 1-13). 
5. That plaintiff admitted she told defendant she did 
not want alimony from him. (TR. 4, P. 39, L. 3-9) . 
6. That plaintiff would be called back to work in mid-
June of 1987 and would earn between $300.00 and $400.00 every 
two weeks. 
7. That despite the fact plaintiff not working at 
the time she filed for divorce, she did not request alimony. 
(TR. 4, P. 58, L. 6-11). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The lower Court should not have modified the parties' 
original Stipulation, because of the lack of service of any 
of the changes upon the defendant. 
The Court should not have modified the Stipulation of 
the parties' in the face of plaintiff's repeated assertions 
that she did not want nor did she feel she had any claim to 
the marital home and because there is no evidence that the 
home was acquired thorugh joint marital efforts. 
By awarding alimony to the plaintiff without her having 
requested the same, the Court abused its disretion. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Court subsequently 
acquired jurisdiction over the defendant because of his later 
appearances in Court, the alimony requirement should not have 
commenced until the last Court ruling, when defendant 
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appeared for his Petition to Modify, or from June, 1987. 
Therefore, no judgment representing alimony arrears from 
March of 1986 should have been entered. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO RENDER 
MODIFICATIONS OF THE PARTIES1 ORIGINAL STIPULATION. 
The only mention or assertion of service in this matter 
is that acknowledgement by the defendant in the original 
Stipulation between the parties that he had received a copy 
of the plaintiff's Complaint. 
It is uncontroverted that defendant was never personally 
served with all the final documents that normally concluded a 
divorce proceeding, namely, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Decree. (TR 4, P. 5, L. 4-5 and L. 7-13), nor was 
defendant ever served with notice of the March 19, 1986 
hearing where the Court modified the Stipulation and ordered 
alimony and divided the marital home. Rule 2.9 and Rule 5(a) 
of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts of the State 
of Utah require service upon a party in this situation. 
Defendant, in effect, was denied due process of law when 
the Court's changes were made effective from the March 19, 
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1986 hearing. Constitution of The United States, Amend XIV, 
Sec. 1; Constitution of The United States, Art I, Sec. 7. 
It has been held previously that the trial Court could 
not have jurisdiction to enter a Decree of Divorce where 
there was no effective service of process. Garcia vs. Garcia, 
712 P.2d. 288 (Utah 1986). Therefore, it would follow that 
any other substantive orders commonly occurring in Divorce 
Decrees could not have any validity. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 2 
THE COURT, BECAUSE OF DEFECTIVE SERVICE,COULD NOT HAVE 
ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT UNTIL DEFENDANT 
APPEARED IN THE ACTION BY HIS FILING THE PETITION TO MODIFY. 
Defendant does not contend the Court could not have 
awarded plaintiff the Decree of Divorce. However, orders 
concerning alimony and allocation of property should only 
have been effective after defendant appeared in the action 
through his Petition to Modify. Robinson and Wells, P.C. vs. 
Warren, 669 P.2d 844 (Utah 1983). 
Also, a party never served with process is not subject 
to the Court's jurisdiction until the party appears in the 
action. Wagoner vs. Sounier, 627 P.2d 428 (Okla., 1981). It 
would follow, therefore, that the lower Court erred by 
entering a judgment against defendant for unpaid alimony 
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arrears that accrued from March 19, 1986. No alimony order 
should have been effective against defendant until the Order 
resulting from defendant's Petition to Modify was signed and 
entered. See also, Larsen vs. Larsen, 561 P.2d 1077 (Utah, 
1977) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 3 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY AWARDING PLAINTIFF 
ALIMONY AND AN INTEREST IN THE HOME CONTRARY TO THE AGREEMENT 
OF THE PARTIES1. 
A reading of the record in the first proceeding, (TR. 1) 
indicates the plaintiff declined alimony even after 
questioning by the Court. (TR. 1, P.7, L.6 and L.14-15 and 
P.8, L.11-13). Even at the second hearing, plaintiff never 
affirmatively requested alimony. 
The same argument of judicial abuse applies similarly to 
the Court allocating to plaintiff an interest in the 
residence of the parties'. 
It cannot be sufficiently emphasized that the parties, 
in arms length negotiations, contracted and thereafter 
embodied their agreement in the Stipulation subsequently 
rejected by the Court. Further, plaintiff had advice of 
counsel while defendant proceeded pro se. 
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While defendant recognizes the wide discretion the trial 
Court possesses in divorce actions, the Appellate Court can 
alter and amend the findings of the lower Court. 
Constitution of Utah, Art. VIII, Sec. 9. 
Defendant's position is that the lower Court overstepped 
bounds of judicial propriety and neutrality when it literally 
imposed an alimony and housing award contrary to the stated 
desires of both parties. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 4 
THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY APPLIED THE LAW WHEN IT 
AWARDED PLAINTIFF AN INTEREST IN THE RESIDENCE. 
Without conceding the abuse of discretion position 
previously presented, defendant respectfully submits that the 
Court should not have awarded plaintiff an interest in the 
home inherited from his father. (TR 2, P.7, L.20). 
The record is absolutely void of any testimony or other 
evidence that the residence was acquired or thereafter 
improved or increased in value because of joint marital 
efforts. It appears settled in Utah that inherited property 
is not considered a part of the marital estate that should be 
allocated unless the same was acquired or improved as a 
result of the joint marital effort of the parties. Preston 
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vs. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah, 1982); Burke vs. Burke, 51 
Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (1987). 
The record of the 4th hearing, the Petition to Modify, 
shows that plaintiff not only did not know the age of the 
home, but was unclear as to whether any improvements have 
been made of the home. (TR 4, P. 53, L.6-10), nor was she 
clear as to its value (TR. 4, P.53, L.13-17). In fact 
instead of testifying what, if any, improvements had been 
made, plaintiff instead informed the Court of the home's need 
of repair. (TR. 4, P.53, L.19-23). 
Therefore, without evidence of plaintiff's contributions 
and efforts, the Court erred in awarding her a portion of the 
home. 
F i n a l l y , a l a s t e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e r e c o r d i n t h e 
P e t i t i o n to Modify a t , P . 3 8 , L . 2 1 - 2 3 , i n d i c a t e s p l a i n t i f f 
a c c e p t e d the i n t e r e s t in the home s imply because the awards 
went h a n d - i n - h a n d w i t h t h e award of t h e d i v o r c e , and t h e 
q u o t e t h e p l a i n t i f f , " t h a t ' s the o n l y way I c o u l d g e t 
i t " (TR. 4 , P . 3 8 , L . 2 2 - 2 3 ) . 
CONCLUSION 
The trial Court was without power to enter Orders 
against defendant without proper service upon him until the 
defendant made a general appearance in the action by filing 
his Petition to Modify. Having entered judgment against 
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defendant, the Court violated defendant's right to due 
process. 
Even after the Court acquired jurisdiction, it should 
not have entered a judgment against defendant for alimony 
arrears simply because the alimony award was not valid until 
June of 1987. Not only was the award of the judgment an 
abuse of discretion, but the alimony and real property award 
to the plaintiff was contrary to the parties1 intentions and 
to settled Utah legal principles. 
The Court of Appeals should reverse the judgment of the 
lower Court, set aside the judgment for alimony arrears, and 
restore the parties to their original position they found 
themselves in after they executed the Stipulation by 
eliminating plaintiff's alimony and real property interest 
award. 
KENT T. YANO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Constitution of The United States, Amend. XIV, Sec. 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No state 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
2. Constitution of The State of Utah, Art. I, Sec. 7, and 
Art. VIII, Sec. 9. 
(Art. 1, Sec. 7:) No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process. 
(Art. VII, Sec. 9). From all final judgments of the 
district courts, there shall be a right of appeal to the 
Supreme Court. The appeal shall be upon the record made in 
the court below and under such regulations as may be provided 
by law. In equity cases the appeal may be on questions of 
both law and fact; in cases at law the appeal shall be on 
questions of law alone. Appeals shall also lie from the final 
orders and decrees of the Court in the administration of 
decedent estates, and in cases of guardianship, as shall be 
provided by law. Appeals shall also lie from the final 
judgment of justices of the peace in civil and criminal cases 
to the District Courts on both questions of law and fact, with 
such limitations and restrictions as shall be provided by law; 
and the decision of the District Courts on such appeals shall 
be final in cases involving the validity or constitutionality 
of a statute. 
3. Rule 2.9 of The Rules of Practice, in the District 
Courts of the State of Utah: 
(a) In all rulings by a Court, counsel for the 
party or parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen 
(15) days, or within shorter time as the Court may direct, 
file with the Court a proposed Order, Judgment or Decree in 
conformity with the ruling. 
(b) Copies of the proposed Findings, Judgments, 
and/or Orders shall be served on opposing counsel before being 
presented to the Court for signature unless the Court 
otherwise orders. Notice of objections thereto shall be 
submitted to the Court and counsel within (5) days after 
service. 
(c) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall be 
reduced to writing and presented to the Court for signature 
within fifteen (15) days of the settlement and dismissal. 
4. Rule 5(a) of The Rules of Practice in the District Courts 
of the State of Utah: 
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(a) Service: When required. Except as otherwise 
provided in these rules, every order required by its terms to 
be served, every pleading subsequent to the original Complaint 
unless the Court otherwise orders because of numerous 
defendants, every paper relating to discovery required to be 
served upon a party unless the court otherwise orders, every 
written notice other than one which may be heard ex parte, and 
every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, 
notice of signing or entry of judgment under Rule 58(d), and 
similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties. No 
service need be made on parties in default for failure to 
appear except as provided in Rule 55(a) (2) (default 
proceedings) or pleadings asserting new or additional claims 
for relief against them which shall be served upon them in the 
manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4. 
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